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Previous psycholinguistics studies have shown that when forming a long distance
dependency in online processing, the parser sometimes accepts a sentence even though
the required grammatical constraints are only partially met. A mechanistic account of how
such errors arise sheds light on both the underlying linguistic representations involved
and the processing mechanisms that put such representations together. In the current
study, we contrast the negative polarity items (NPI) interference effect, as shown by
the acceptance of an ungrammatical sentence like “The bills that democratic senators
have voted for will ever become law,” with the well-known phenomenon of agreement
attraction (“The key to the cabinets are . . . ”). On the surface, these two types of errors
look alike and thereby can be explained as being driven by the same source: similarity
based memory interference. However, we argue that the linguistic representations
involved in NPI licensing are substantially different from those of subject-verb agreement,
and therefore the interference effects in each domain potentially arise from distinct
sources. In particular, we show that NPI interference at least partially arises from pragmatic
inferences. In a self-paced reading study with an acceptability judgment task, we showed
NPI interference was modulated by participants’ general pragmatic communicative skills,
as quantified by the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), especially
in offline tasks. Participants with more autistic traits were actually less prone to the
NPI interference effect than those with fewer autistic traits. This result contrasted with
agreement attraction conditions, which were not influenced by individual pragmatic skill
differences. We also show that different NPI licensors seem to have distinct interference
profiles. We discuss two kinds of interference effects for NPI licensing: memory-retrieval
based and pragmatically triggered.
Keywords: memory interference, pragmatic inference, individual differences, autistic traits, NPI licensing
INTRODUCTION
During the processing of long distance dependencies, sometimes
an element in a sentence that should be irrelevant for con-
structing a dependency interferes—a phenomenon that has been
dubbed the “interference effect.” For instance, agreement attrac-
tion errors, such as ∗the key to the cabinets are . . . , involve an
agreement dependency between the singular subject the key and
the plural copula verb are which is ungrammatical because of
a number mismatch. However, the intervening noun “cabinets”
interferes, facilitating the processing of the ungrammatical sen-
tence1. Facilitation effects from an interfering element have been
shown by various processing measures: such sentences are rela-
tively common in spontaneous production; they can be elicited in
controlled laboratory experiments; they are judged to be relatively
acceptable; and online reading times on the otherwise problem-
atic verb are generally reduced compared to number mismatched
1Cue similarity does not always lead to facilitation effect. For instance, Van
Dyke and Lewis (2003) and Van Dyke and McElree (2006) have shown that
cue overload leads to increased processing difficulty. In this paper, we only
focus on the facilitatory interference effect.
verbs without interference (Bock and Miller, 1991; Bock and
Eberhard, 1993; Pearlmutter et al., 1999; Eberhard et al., 2005;
Wagers et al., 2009; Dillon et al., 2013).
Such interference effects have been explained as instances
of memory interference triggered during cue based memory
retrieval. During incremental parsing of a long distance depen-
dency, the tail of the dependency initiates the retrieval of the head
in memory. This retrieval is prone to interference when the inter-
mediately preceding material shares certain features with the set
of retrieval cues that the parser employs (McElree et al., 2003;
Lewis and Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006; Wagers et al., 2009).
Memory interference can be driven by partially matchedmorpho-
syntactic features, as has been repeatedly shown by agreement
attraction errors like the example above, and examples like “The
new executive who oversaw the middle managers were dishon-
est” (example from Dillon et al., 2013). In such cases, memory
retrieval is initiated in order to search for a plural subject at the
plural verb, e.g., “were.” Because the search mechanism is content
addressable (McElree et al., 2003), it may target any item in mem-
ory during the search process, leading to erroneous acceptance of
interfering material which bears feature similarity to the correct
retrieval target.
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A large body of the research on interference effects has focused
on deriving a thorough mechanistic account of the errors peo-
ple make in interference situations, as such an account helps in
constructing a precise parsing algorithm for long distance depen-
dencies. But the pursuit of a domain-general parsing mechanism
has somewhat overshadowed the question of whether or not dif-
ferent kinds of linguistic dependencies should be handled by the
same parsing algorithm, and hence whether or not interference
arises in the same way across different dependency types. One
reasonable hypothesis is that the precise nature of a particular
type of linguistic dependency is relevant to explaining differ-
ences in how dependencies are processed. In the current study,
we tackle the question of whether or not there are dependency-
dependent interference effects by looking at a case of interference
that seems very much like agreement attraction on the surface,
but that may at least partially arise from a different underlying
mechanism. The particular type of interference we will discuss
appears in the licensing of negative polarity items (NPIs), as in
the sentence “∗The documentaries that no network TV stations
have played during prime time have ever been very controversial,”
where the presence of ever is illicit. We argue that although such
interference may superficially look the same as the subject-verb
agreement errors discussed above, there are actually multiple dif-
ferent sources that contribute to NPI interference. In particular,
in addition to a memory-retrieval based interference that is sim-
ilar to agreement interference, there is also a separate rout of
pragmatic inferences made at the message level during semantic
integration. A sufficient account of NPI interference needs to take
into account the close interaction between grammar (e.g., syntax
and semantics) and pragmatic inference in sentence processing.
NPI LICENSING AND INTERFERENCE
NPIs are lexical items that need to be licensed in an environment
that possesses a particular logical-semantic property. Negation
is a cross-linguistically attested licensor for NPIs (as noticed
in Klima, 1964). Licensing typically requires the NPI to be in
the semantic and syntactic scope (i.e., c-command domain) of
negation (Ladusaw, 1979, 1980; Giannakidou, 1998, 2011 for an
overview). As shown in (1), the NPIs any and ever are grammati-
cally licensed when they appear within the scope of negation (1a,
b), but they are ungrammatical when there is no negation present
(1c, d), or when negation is present, but doesn’t c-command the
NPI (1e, f).
(1) a. John didn’t talk to anybody.
b. John hasn’t ever talked to Bill.
∗c. John has ever talked to Bill.
∗d. John talked to anybody.
∗e. Anybody didn’t talk to John.
∗f. The debate that nobody cared about will ever end.
Because of their apparent sensitivity to the presence of nega-
tion, any and ever are labeled “negative” polarity items
(NPIs) 2, but it must be noted that their distribution, and that
2Some NPIs, such as any, seem to obtain so-called free choice readings in
modal environments and with imperatives, such as You may talk to any stu-
dent, and Pick any card!. We won’t discuss the free choice use in this paper. The
of similar NPIs crosslinguistically, is quite broad and includes
a vast range of negative and non-negative licensors, includ-
ing conditionals, modal verbs, generic sentences, questions, the
scope of universal quantifiers, comparatives, disjunctions (see
Giannakidou, 2011 for detailed overview). Given this broad
distribution and the potential differences among NPI classes
in English and crosslinguistically, what semantic property uni-
fies licensors as a natural class has been a matter of intense
study—and researchers generally agree that NPIs appear in non-
veridical environments. Non-veridical environments are (a) nega-
tive environments with negation and negative quantifiers (Baker,
1970a; Linebarger, 1980), (b) downward entailing environments
(Ladusaw, 1980; Zwarts, 1986, 1996; Hoeksema, 1994; von Fintel,
1999, inter alia), and (c) other non-veridical environments that
may not be negative or downward entailing (e.g., modal expres-
sions, questions, imperatives, generic statements; Zwarts, 1995;
Giannakidou, 1998, 2006, 2011; Bernardi, 2002). We cannot pro-
vide a detailed survey here; but as background for the specific
data we address, we discuss licensing by negation and downward
entailment (DE) in the next section3.
In the domain of NPI licensing, an “interference effect” is said
to result when an unlicensed NPI becomes more acceptable if a
licensor is inserted into the preceding context—but crucially, is
not in the right structural (c-commanding) position (Drenhaus
et al., 2005; Vasishth et al., 2005, 2008). In the example below
(examples taken from Drenhaus et al., 2005), the expected con-
trast obtains between (2a) and (2b); however, there is also a
significant difference between the ungrammatical sentences (2b)
and (2c). (2c) is judged as “more acceptable” than (2b), even
though the licensor no doesn’t c-command the NPI ever, so that
it should be unlicensed.
(2) a. No man who had a beard was ever happy.
∗b. A man who had a beard was ever happy.
∗c. A man who had no beard was ever happy.
In the (c) example, negation is present but not in a position
c-commanding ever, as is required for licensing. The NPI ever
therefore remains unlicensed. In online measures, NPI interfer-
ence effects have appeared as facilitatory effects (e.g., shorter RTs
or smaller ERP amplitudes) on the problematic NPI in the inter-
ference condition, as compared to the NPI in the condition with
no licensors anywhere in the sentence (Drenhaus et al., 2005;
Vasishth et al., 2008; Xiang et al., 2009; Parker et al., 2013).
The interference effect above is on the surface very simi-
lar to the memory interference phenomenon introduced earlier
particular NPI ever studied in our experiment, does not have a free choice use
and it is typically blocked in modal contexts: ∗You may ever go to Paris.
3A scalar component has also been posited for some NPIs (Kadmon and
Landman, 1993; Krifka, 1995; Lahiri, 1998; Chierchia, 2006), but scalarity
doesn’t characterize all NPIs as a class. There are many non-scalar NPIs (see
Giannakidou, 1998, 2011, for a recent overview (Lin, 1996; Giannakidou and
Yoon, 2012). And scalar NPIs such as any and ever do not have only scalar
uses (Duffley and Larivée, 2010), and are not morphologically marked as
scalar either, i.e., they do not contain scalar markers such as even and the like.
Whether scalarity plays a role in the interference effect is an open question for
future research.
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for subject-verb agreement. One account of NPI interference is
indeed couched upon retrieval interference due to feature sim-
ilarity between the retrieval cues and the previously processed
linguistic information. Vasishth et al. (2008) argued that the
parser uses lexical semantic cues such as [+negative] and syntac-
tic cues such as [+c-command] to retrieve a proper licensor for
ever from previously processed material in memory. For (2b), no
such match is found, and the sentence is determined to be unac-
ceptable. For (2c), however, the quantifier no in the embedded
subject position partially matches the search criteria: although it
doesn’t match the syntactic cue [+c-command], it does satisfy
the cue [+negative]. During retrieval of a licensor, this partial
feature match may boost the activation level of the memory rep-
resentation of the embedded quantifier no, causing it to be more
likely to be retrieved once its activation level goes beyond a certain
threshold.
Although such an account is plausible, as well as parsimo-
nious, we think it falls short of providing a complete account
of NPI interference, because it misses some important distinc-
tions between NPI licensing, on the one hand, and syntactic
dependencies such as subject-verb agreement and those involved
in relative clauses and cleft constructions, on the other hand.
Specifically, while the latter dependencies types involve syntactic
relations between lexical items (e.g., a subject and an agree-
ing verb, or a head noun and a verb in a relative clause),
NPI licensing involves not only syntactic conditions (e.g., the c-
command requirement on a proper licensor, but also see our
remarks in the general discussion about this syntactic condition),
but also logical-semantic (e.g., negation, DE, non-veridicality),
and pragmatic conditions. Crucially different from subject-verb
agreement, pragmatic inferences derived from global semantic
interpretation (which traditionally have been considered outside
of the grammar proper), can be used to license NPIs (Linebarger,
1980, 1987; Giannakidou, 1998, 2006). We will discuss the prag-
matic licensing mechanism in more detail in the next section.
Closely related to the fact that NPI licensing involves mul-
tiple mechanisms, there are many different types of licensors
other than just the negative determiner no, which has been the
focus of most of the studies on NPI interference. Interference
under the licensor no may look superficially similar to subject-
verb agreement, because one can identify a [+negative] feature
on the licensor, which, when served as a memory retrieval cue,
may lead to interference. Whether or not this is indeed the under-
lying mechanism, or only one of the mechanisms involved, is an
empirical question we will address in this paper, but a cue-driven
process is at least a logical possibility here. Importantly, when we
look at a larger set of licensors, postulating a lexical [+negative]
feature becomes untenable for many of them: for instance, with a
universal quantifier every, focus only, conditional if, emotive fac-
tives like surprised, amazed, etc. We focus on only here, since it
can be used as a determiner and therefore constitutes a minimal
pair with no. We assume that only licenses NPIs through a neg-
ative exceptive component, since a sentence of the form “[Only
NP] VP” entails “[Nobody other than NP] VP” (see the discus-
sion in the section below). But there is little reason to believe
that only itself contains in its lexical entry a grammatical/syntactic
[+negative] feature. Klima (1964) gave syntactic diagnostics for
syntactically negative expressions, which include phonologically
and morphologically negative expression such as no, none, never,
but also negative expressions that are not overtly marked in mor-
phology or phonology as negative, such as few, scarcely, hardly,
seldom, rarely, etc. For example, all of these expressions can be fol-
lowed by a conjunct with a neither-tag, but not by so-tag; theymay
also co-occur in a conjunct with either, but not with too; etc. We
provide some examples below, showing that only is not a negative
expression under these syntactic diagnostics. Nor are the other
non-negative licensors we mentioned above, as the reader may
verify.
(3) a. Publishers will usually reject suggestions, and
no/few/∗only/∗a few writers will accept them, either.
b. Publishers will not/hardly/seldom/rarely/∗only/∗usually
accept suggestions, and neither will the writers.
In the absence of a lexically coded [+negative] feature that can
trigger a similarity-based interference effect (as with only), the
question arises whether or not we will still see interference, and,
if we do see such an effect, what would account for it. We will
address these questions in the current study by examining both
the licensors only and no.
FLEXIBILITY OF LICENSING WITH ENGLISH NPIs: THE ROLE OF
PRAGMATIC INFERENCING
It has long been observed that some NPIs become licensed even
when no grammatical lexical licensors are present on the surface
that contain the required logical-semantic property for licensing.
The following examples are largely taken from Linebarger (1987):
(4) a. John kept writing novels long after he had any reason to
believe they would sell.
b. Exactly four people in the world would have ever read that
dissertation: Bill, Mary, Tom, and Ed.
c. Mary was surprised there was any food left.
d. I am sorry that I ever met him.
e. Only the students who have ever read anything about
phrenology attended the lectures. [=117 in Ladusaw
(1980)]
In all these examples, there aren’t any explicit lexical items that
can serve as grammatical licensors, in the sense that they possess
the logical property necessary for licensing. Surely, the items long
after, exactly four, amazed/surprised, and only are responsible for
the appearance of any and ever, but they are not logically negative,
nor DE, nor non-veridical. Consider the property of negation/DE.
DE expressions, as is traditionally stated, allow logical inferences
in their scope from a set to a subset. Consider the following entail-
ment relations with negation [examples adapted from Linebarger
(1987)].
(5) a. John didn’t eat a green vegetable for dinner.
b. John didn’t eat kale for dinner.
Kale is a subset of green vegetables. If John didn’t eat a green
vegetable for dinner (5a), it logically follows that John didn’t eat
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kale for dinner (5b). The superset-to-subset logical inference is
the hallmark of negative and DE expressions. Ladusaw proposed
that NPIs appear in the scope of negative and other DE expres-
sions (such as negative quantifier few, or the restrictor of universal
quantifier every). However, none of the examples in (4) contains
a DE expression. We show below on this point for “only” and
“long after” [see Linebarger (1987); Atlas (1993); Horn (1996);
von Fintel (1999) and Giannakidou (2006) for more discussion
that only and emotive factive verbs such as sorry and surprise are
not DE in its strict sense].
(6) a. Only Bill went to Greece;
b. Only Bill went to Athens.
(7) a. Bill married Samantha long after he travelled to Europe.
b. Bill married Samantha long after he travelled to France.
We see here that the subset inference from (a) to (b) sentences in
(6) and (7) is not licensed with the critical expressions “only” and
“long after,” and they are therefore not logically DE4.
Faced with many examples of this kind, in which a gram-
matical licensing mechanism relying on the logical properties
of a licensor does not seem to suffice, several researchers have
advanced proposals to distinguish a pragmatic licensing mecha-
nism from a grammatical (syntactic/semantic) one. Giannakidou
(1998, 2006), for example, talks about two modes of licensing,
one semantic, relying on a (c-commanding) grammatical licenser
(“direct” licensing), and another, “global pragmatic” licensing
(“indirect” licensing) that relies on the availability of a nega-
tive inference. In the regular case, NPIs are licensed directly by
an expression that bears the required logical-semantic property.
However, in the absence of such a grammatical licensor, either
the use of an NPI leads to ungrammaticality, or the context
enables comprehenders to derive a negative inference pragmat-
ically, which in turn licenses NPIs (see also Baker, 1970a,b;
Linebarger, 1987). Such pragmatic inferences have been called
“implicatures,” and we will refer to them as such from now on5
. Linebarger (1987) and Giannakidou (2006) have considered
only as a candidate for pragmatic licensing. The basic intuition
there is that the exclusive component in the meaning of only is
responsible for licensing NPIs (e.g., Only John ate kale entails
that Nobody other than John ate kale). In our recent work (Xiang
et al., 2012, 2013), based on ERP evidence, we argued that only
is a semantic licensor that licenses NPIs through negation in the
asserted content (see Atlas, 1993; Horn, 1996, for the semantics
4There is ongoing discussion on these expressions. For only and emotive fac-
tives, von Fintel (1999) and Gajewski (2005) analyzed them as Strawson DE,
rather than regular DE expressions. Limited by space, we won’t discuss further
about this possibility, but see theoretical and experimental evidence for prob-
lems of this approach in Linebarger (1987), Giannakidou (2006) and Xiang
et al. (2012, 2013). We also won’t go into further discussion about long after,
since it is not the focus of this paper, but see Condoravdi (2010) that proposed
a DE analysis, and also Krifka (2010) for a discussion.
5Although we adopt the term “implicature” here, it should be clear from our
discussion that we are aware this concept is still very vague. Not all negative
implicatures can license NPIs. The exact grammatical constraints and mecha-
nisms that rule in some “implicatures” but rule out others remain as an open
question.
of only). Although they are different in their specific details, none
of these proposals treat only as a negative expression that con-
tains a lexically coded [+negative] feature, keeping in line with
our discussion in the last section.
It is also crucial to note that, although licensing through global
pragmatic reasoning is a possible mode of licensing for many
NPIs, not all negative implicatures can be used to make NPIs
acceptable (Linebarger, 1987; Horn, 1989, 2002; Giannakidou,
2006). For instance, “almost”—though clearly inviting a negative
inference (John almost finished the book implies that he did not
finish it)—does not license NPIs: ∗John almost finished anything 6
. Although the boundary between inferences that can and cannot
license NPIs is still an open question, we follow the suggestion in
Linebarger (1987) and assume that in order for a derived nega-
tive inference to be able to license NPIs, it should be prominent
in the sense that the derived proposition warrants the truth of the
original proposition. Consider our earlier example with long after:
(8) a. John kept writing novels long after he had any reason to
believe they would sell.
b. John kept writing novels even though he didn’t have any
reason to believe they would sell.
The NPI any in (8a) is licensed under the derived negative impli-
cature (8b). There is a very strong inference to (8b) from (8a), and
in fact the two are almost semantically equivalent. Most impor-
tant, if (8b) is true, then it is also true that John kept writing novels
long after he had any reason to believe they would sell. It seems,
then that a “useful” negative inference is one that is semantically
close enough to the original proposition. How to formally quan-
tify the notion of “semantic closeness” is an open question and
is beyond the scope of the current discussion. What is crucial for
current purposes is, first that negative implicatures provide a pos-
sible licensing mechanism, at least in English; and second, not
all negative implicatures can license NPIs. It is possible that the
difference between the “useful” and “useless” inferences is a cat-
egorical one, but it is also possible that the two simply occupy
different ends of a continuum of pragmatic inferences, on which
one finds different degrees of “licensing strength.” We will leave
this question open. We turn below to the empirical focus of the
current paper: the case of NPI interference. We will argue that the
interference observed in NPI licensing is at least partially driven
by the over-application of the pragmatic licensing mechanism.
That is, in cases of NPI interference, comprehenders resort to the
pragmatic strategy, i.e., they attempt to use a pragmatic inference,
which, however, cannot properly license NPIs. The effect is that
such an illicit interference will occasionally boost the acceptability
of unlicensed NPIs. The availability of such pragmatic inferences,
as we will show, is modulated by individual subjects’ pragmatic
skills.
INTERFERENCE DRIVEN BY PRAGMATIC INFERENCE
Xiang et al. (2009) argued that the NPI interference effect stems
from over-application of a flexible, inference-based licensing
6See Horn (2002) for the idea and the negative component in “almost” is
“assertorically inert,” in contrast to “barely,” and hence does not license NPIs.
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mechanism that is already in place in the grammar. One possi-
bility, as suggested in Xiang et al. (2009), is that, while parsing
a statement like “the bills that no democratic senators have voted
for will P” (“P” stands for an upcoming predicate), people gen-
erate a negative inference about a contrasting set of referents “the
bills that democratic senators HAVE voted for will NOT have the
same property P” on some proportion of trials. Note that such
an inference is not logically valid, nor can it be derived from
any proper grammatical device. But the particular construction
involved in NPI interference effect, i.e., relative clauses, may be
responsible for triggering such negative inferences. It is known
that restrictive modifiers generally invite inferences about a con-
trastive set of referents pragmatically (Altmann and Steedman,
1988; Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Sedivy et al., 1999). It has been
shown that people are very sensitive to the pragmatic cues of
restrictive modifiers: restrictive modifiers perform a discourse
function to distinguish the set of referents that possess the prop-
erty described by the modifier and the set that do not. Such
discourse principles are active in parsing because interlocutors
engaged in a discourse interaction adhere to the general commu-
nicative principle that the exchange of information should be as
informative as it needs to be (Grice, maxim of quantity, 1975). To
our knowledge, almost all studies on NPI interference so far in the
literature have used restrictive relative clauses to host an “intrud-
ing” licensor. It is plausible then to argue that the choice of this
particular structure facilitates the triggering of negative inferences
about a contrasting set.
Although pragmatic inferences driven by communicative pres-
sure are very common in natural language communication,
they in general are not qualified to actually license NPIs. If
we adopt our rudimentary notion of “semantic closeness” in
the last section, the negative inferences made in the interfer-
ence scenarios are not “close” enough to the original proposi-
tions. Consider again the interference example “The bills that
no democratic senators have voted for will become law.” The
potential negative inference “The bills that democratic senators
have voted for will NOT become law” does not have similar
enough truth-conditions to the original proposition. Not being
semantically close, the negative inference is too weak to ren-
der NPIs totally acceptable. But since pragmatic inferences may
in principle license NPIs in English, comprehenders may over-
apply this mechanism and use it in some proportion of the
ungrammatical trials, so that negative inferences that are nor-
mally not useful for NPI licensing have a facilitating effect on
acceptability.
If the interference effect with NPIs is due to over-application of
pragmatic inferences, in which subjects extract a negative impli-
cature from the given context, we predict that NPI interference
effects should be modulated by individual participants’ ability to
extract pragmatic inferences from context. Different individuals
may possess varying abilities to carry out complex pragmatic rea-
soning, and we hypothesize that participants who are better at
pragmatic reasoning will be more prone to an NPI interference
effects, since it is more likely for these participants to successfully
construct negative inferences from context, making them more
vulnerable to over-applying the pragmatic licensing mechanism.
On the other hand, participants who are less skilled in pragmatic
inference will generate fewer inferences, and these participants
will be more likely to avoid the interference effect.
Furthermore, in the current study, we compare NPI interfer-
ence with a purely syntactic dependency: subject-verb agreement.
We predict that, if the correlation between pragmatic skills and
interference in NPI licensing is driven by over-application of
a pragmatic-licensing mechanism that is specific to NPIs, no
similar correlation should hold between the magnitude of the
agreement interference (attraction) effect and individual prag-
matic differences, despite the superficial similarity between NPI
interference and agreement attraction errors. We test these pre-
dictions in the current study. Individual pragmatic skills of our
participants were assessed and quantified by the autism-spectrum
quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), which we turn to now.
THE AUTISM-SPECTRUM QUOTIENT
Pragmatic language problems are among some of the defin-
ing characteristics of children and adults with autism (Bishop,
1989; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). For example, their linguistic
behavior may often consist in inappropriate comments; and they
may have difficulty comprehending jokes, sarcasm, and indirect
requests (Happé, 1993; Ozonoff and Miller, 1996; Wang et al.,
2006). However, it is increasingly recognized that autistic traits
are likely to be present on a continuum among the general popu-
lation, and people who are diagnosed as autistic simply represent
one end of this continuum. This raises the possibility that even
among the neurotypical population, there exist individual prag-
matic differences associated with individual autistic traits. The
AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) assesses the extent of autistic
traits that neurotypical individuals possess. There are a total of
50 questions, divided into 5 subscales, each with 10 statements, to
which the subject must reply with one of the choices: “Definitely
agree,” “Slightly agree,” “Slightly disagree,” or “Definitely dis-
agree.” The 5 subsets of questions are designed to tap into five
different cognitive functions that have been found to be impor-
tant when characterizing autistic behavior. The five subscales and
a corresponding example item are: social skills (e.g., “I prefer to
do things with others rather than on my own.”); communica-
tion (e.g., “Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said
is impolite, even though I think it is polite.”); attention to detail
(e.g., “I often notice small sounds when others do not.”); imag-
ination (e.g., “If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy
to create a picture in my mind.”); attention switching (e.g., “I
prefer to do things the same way over and over again”). Half
of the questions are designed to elicit an answer of “definitely
agree” or “slightly agree”; and the other half, “definitely disagree”
or “slightly disagree.” Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) provide scoring
guidelines. Higher scores indicate more association with autistic
traits.
There is an increasing number of studies that document the
correlation between AQ (or AQ subscale) scores and process-
ing in certain specific linguistic domains among the neurotypical
population (Stewart and Ota, 2008; Nieuwland et al., 2010; Yu,
2010). Particularly relevant for current purposes, the communi-
cation and social skills subscales have been linked to pragmatic
language comprehension; in particular, the processing of scalar
implicatures (Nieuwland et al., 2010; Sikos et al., 2013) and
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perspective taking (Grodner et al., 2012). For example, Nieuwland
et al. (2010) showed that when computing scalar implicatures
(e.g., some implies not all), participants’ ability to generate scalar
implicatures online was significantly correlated with their com-
munication subscale scores (CS scores). In particular, participants
with better communication skills (i.e., lower CS scores) weremore
likely to access the scalar implicature interpretation of a sentence
like “some elephants have trunks,” and consequently detect the
anomaly of under-informativity.
The growing body of work that shows a correlation between
AQ scores and pragmatic language skills makes the AQ a suit-
able tool for the current study to probe the underlying differ-
ences between NPI and subject-verb agreement dependencies.
Admittedly, such a correlation only provides a classificatory diag-
nostic, rather than an explanation of the mechanisms underlying
pragmatic reasoning, since it is not yet clear how the commu-
nicative and social skills measured in the AQ are recruited in
language comprehension. Although the exact nature of the link
between extra-linguistic skills and linguistic pragmatic reasoning
is not well-understood, the link itself is nevertheless supported
by empirical evidence, suggesting that the same cognitive mecha-
nismsmay be shared between the two types of tasks. Thus, the AQ
provides us with a way to operationalize individual differences in
pragmatic reasoning.
CURRENT EXPERIMENT
METHOD
Materials
There are two types of target items in this study: NPI and subject-
verb agreement. Table 1 gives an example of each type. For the
NPI materials, there are three basic types of conditions. In the
Licensed conditions (9a and 9b), the NPI ever is licensed by a
grammatical licensor. In the Interference conditions (9c and 9d),
ever is not licensed properly: even though there are licensors
Table 1 | Example stimuli.
(9) NPI
a/c Licensed No/only documentaries that the network TV
stations have played during prime time have
ever been very controversial.
b/d Interference The documentaries that no/only network TV
stations have played during prime time have
ever been very controversial.
e Plain Unlicensed The documentaries that the network TV stations
have played during prime time have ever been
very popular.
(10) AGREEMENT
a Grammatical The receptionist who the boss depends on
never fails to do a stellar job.
b Interference The receptionist who the bosses depend on
never fail to do a stellar job.
c Plain Ungrammatical The receptionist who the boss depends on
never fail to do a stellar job.
(no and only again) in the same context, they are not in a syn-
tactically c-commanding position. Finally, the Plain Unlicensed
conditions contain unlicensed NPIs with no potential licensors in
the preceding context.
For the Licensed and the Interference conditions, we looked at
the two licensors no and only in this study to test the generality
of previously observed interference effects. Only is different from
no in at least two ways: first, as discussed earlier, only does not
contain a [+negative] feature; second, only is much less frequent
than no as a licensor (Xiang et al., 2009). This raises the question
whether or not interference will arise for only, and, if so, whether
or not the same account should apply to both licensors.
The set of agreement items (10a–c) was created using the same
design. In the Grammatical condition, the main verb agrees with
the matrix subject (the receptionist) in its singular number. In
addition, the embedded subject (the boss) is also singular, cre-
ating no interference. In the Interference condition, the matrix
verb fails to agree with the matrix subject, since the matrix subject
is singular whereas the verb is plural. However, the intervening
embedded subject also carries plural number, and hence may be
incorrectly accepted as being in an agreement relation with the
main verb. Finally in the Plain Ungrammatical condition, the
main verb fails to agree correctly with the singular matrix sub-
ject, but the embedded subject is also singular, mismatching the
main verb.
There were 60 sets of the NPI items, 40 sets of the agreement
items, as well as 38 extra fillers. The items were distributed into
multiple lists using a Latin square design, such that no partici-
pant was presented with more than one condition from the same
item set.
Participants and procedure
Ninty-two native English speakers (mean age = 20, sd = 3.2, 52
female, 40 male) from the University of Chicago campus and sur-
rounding area participated in the study for $10 payment or course
credit. Each participant finished a self-paced reading task and also
completed an AQ questionnaire (see below). The self-paced read-
ing task was presented using the Linger software (Doug Rohde,
MIT). Participants read through each sentence word by word at
their own pace. After the last word of each sentence, a question
appeared that said: “Is this acceptable?” After participants pressed
one of the two answer keys (Y or N) on the keyboard, they went
on to the next trial. Practice trials were provided before the exper-
imental session to familiarize participants with the task. Each
subject also completed an AQ questionnaire either before or after
they completed the self-paced reading task (in a random order).
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Among the 92 participants, one did not finish the AQ question-
naire, and his data was not included in any of the analyses below.
Three additional participants were excluded from the analysis due
to very low overall accuracy across the whole experimental session
(<50% correct). For the rest of the 88 participants, we analyzed
their acceptance rate results and their online reading times at
the critical word ever. The grand average results are presented in
Table 2.
For the data analysis, we will present results frommixed effects
logistic regression models on the acceptance rate data and results
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Table 2 | Average acceptance rate and RTs on the critical word, presented separately for the NPI and the agreement items (with sd in the
parenthesis).
NPI Licensing
No-Licensed No-interference Only-Licensed Only-interference Plain unlicensed
Acceptance rate 0.87 (0.16) 0.25 (0.30) 0.81 (0.17) 0.27 (0.32) 0.16 (0.27)
RT at the CW (ms) 421 (114) 439 (120) 420 (120) 453 (146) 473 (155)
Agreement
Grammatical Interference Plain ungrammatical
Acceptance rate 0.92 (0.18) 0.28 (0.23) 0.12 (0.17)
RT at the CW (ms) 463 (125) 509 (169) 547 (202)
from mixed effects linear regression models on the reading times
(Baayen et al., 2008). The models were constructed using the lmer
function in the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2012). Separate
analyses were carried out for each subset of the target mate-
rials (i.e., NPIs and agreement materials). All models reported
here are maximal models that have converged (Barr et al., 2013).
For the mixed effects models, main interest of comparisons were
set up as contrasts with Helmert coding (Venables and Ripley,
1999; Vasishth and Broe, 2011; Vasishth and Drenhaus, 2011),
and they were included in the mixed effects models as fixed
effect predictors (see below). Since the CS from the AQ ques-
tionnaire was the major subscale that has been shown to reflect
speakers’ pragmatic reasoning abilities in language processing
(Nieuwland et al., 2010; Sikos et al., 2013), we will mainly focus
on this subscale of the AQ 7. Each participant’s CS score was
entered into the mixed effects models as an additional fixed
effect predictor. Random effect structure included random inter-
cepts for subjects and items, as well as random slopes of the
fixed predictors. Before constructing the models, reading times
longer than 2000ms were removed, and all reading times were
log-transformed.
NPI licensing
Acceptance rate. The averaged acceptance rate of each condition
is presented in Table 2. As expected, the two licensed gram-
matical conditions (9a and 9c) have the highest acceptance rate
(0.87 and 0.81), the unlicensed ungrammatical condition (9e)
has the lowest acceptance rate (0.16). Critically, the interference
conditions (9b and 9d) were accepted more often than the non-
interference ungrammatical one (0.25 and 0.27), manifesting a
standard interference effect.
We first analyzed all the data together, using a mixed effects
logistic model. We defined three orthogonal contrasts: the first
contrast examined the grammaticality effect (Grammaticality),
in which the licensed grammatical conditions were contrasted
with the ungrammatical conditions (i.e., a, c vs. b, d, e,); the sec-
ond contrast examined the interference effect (Interference), in
which the interference ungrammatical conditions b and d were
7Among the other subscales, social skill showed a very similar effect as CS.
Other subscales did not show any effect. We report the interactions between
these sub-scales and other fixed effects in the appendix.
contrasted with the unlicensed ungrammatical condition e (b, d
vs. e); in the third contrast (Licensor) the two types of licensors
were compared (a, b vs. c, d). These three contrasts were entered
into the mixed effects model as fixed effect predictors. In addi-
tion, we included each participant’s CS scores from the Autism
Quotient as another fixed effect predictor in the model. Among
the 88 participants included in this analysis, the minimum CS
score was 0 and themaximumwas 10, with a mean of 3.1 (median
3, and standard derivation 2.2). For the random effect structure,
we included random intercepts for both subjects and items, as
well as random slopes of the three user-defined contrasts above.
The model output is presented in Table 3 below:
Table 3 | NPI licensing acceptance rate: fixed effects from the mixed
effect logistic model for the overall data.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
Grammaticality 5.08 0.66 7.74 9.63E-15***
CSscore −0.11 0.08 −1.36 0.18
Interference 1.30 0.22 5.79 6.97E-09***
Licensor 0.65 0.30 2.20 0.03*
Gram:CSscore 0.08 0.17 0.47 0.64
Inter:CSscore −0.13 0.06 −2.15 0.03*
Licensor:CSscore −0.06 0.08 −0.81 0.42
Inter:Licensor −1.03 0.77 −1.34 0.18
CSscore:Inter:Licensor 0.06 0.21 0.27 0.79
lmer[acceptance∼ gram*CSscore+ interfence *CSscore+ licensor *CSscore +
licensor:interference+ licensor:interference:CSscore+ (1+ gram+ interference+
licensor|subj)+ (1+ gram+ interference+ licensor|item), data= dataframe, family
=“binomial 8”]. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
8The model in Table 3 did not include all the interaction terms between
the three user-defined contrasts. Note that the interaction between
Grammaticality and Interference is irrelevant, since there is no interference
to start with on the grammatical conditions (i.e., interference conditions
are themselves all ungrammatical). For the interaction between Licensor and
Grammaticality/Interference, since our experimental design is not a full 2 × 3
factorial design (i.e., there is only one plain unlicensed condition in Table 1),
not all possible interaction combinations are possible. Therefore, we only
included Licensor:Interference in the regression formula, which is essentially
the same as the Licensor:Grammaticality interaction.
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Not surprisingly, the model revealed a significant effect for
both Grammaticality and Interference. What is crucial, is that
there is a significant interaction between the effect of Interference
and CS scores, indicating that the difference between the inter-
ference condition on the one hand, and the plain unlicensed
condition on the other, is affected by participants’ general prag-
matic skills assessed via their CS scores. In addition, there is also
an effect of Licensor, suggesting a difference between the no and
only conditions.
The effect of licensor type
The data from licensor no and only are plotted separately in
Figure 1. The unlicensed condition is shared by the two licensor
groups (i.e., condition e in Table 1).
Paired comparisons between conditions showed that sentences
licensed under no were accepted more often than those licensed
under only (condition a vs. c in Table 1, p < 0.001); but the inter-
ference condition under no is not different from the interference
condition under only (condition b vs. d, p > 0.2). Therefore, the
effect of Licensor observed in Table 3 was mainly driven by the
grammatical conditions: subjects were slightly more resistant in
accepting only as a grammatical licensor. We will come back to
this observation in the general discussion.
The Interference-by-CS-scores interaction
Our model showed a robust interaction between the Interference
effect and CS scores. We further discuss what this interaction
entails in this section. Since our model revealed no interaction
between CS scores and licensor type (i.e., neither three-way nor
two-way interactions), we do not expect the effect of CS scores on
interference to be conditioned by licensor type. For the complete-
ness of our presentation, however, we present results from no and
only separately.
In the analysis of licensor no, we only present the three relevant
conditions in Table 1: conditions 9a, b, and e. The mixed effects
model was constructed largely in the same way as before, except
that only two contrasts were defined as fixed effect predictors:
Grammaticality, which contrasted the grammatical condition 9a
with the other two ungrammatical conditions (i.e., a vs. b and e);
and Interference, which compared the interference ungrammati-
cal condition 9b with the unlicensed ungrammatical condition e
FIGURE 1 | Acceptance rate for the two different licensors.
(b vs. e). For only, the three relevant conditions were 9c, d, and e
in Table 1, and the two contrasts were defined as Grammaticality
(c vs. d, e) and Interference (d vs. e). The model results for the
fixed effects are presented in Table 4.
As expected, both the Grammaticality effect and the
Interference effect are highly significant, and the interaction
between Interference and CS scores is also significant. To better
understand the interaction between CS scores and the interfer-
ence effect, we did the following two analyses for licensor no
and only separately. For each subset of the data, we first carried
out a correlation analysis between the size of the interference
effect and individual participants’ CS scores. For each partici-
pant, we calculated a difference score between their acceptance
rates, averaged across items, in the interference condition and the
plain unlicensed condition. This difference score represents the
size of the interference effect for each subject. We then correlated
these difference scores with their CS scores. There is a significant
negative correlation between the difference scores and partici-
pants’ CS scores for licensor no [Pearson’s r = −0.28, t(86) =
−2.7, p < 0.01], as well as for licensor only (Pearson’s r = −0.21,
p < 0.05). The negative correlation suggests that the higher a
participant’s CS score, the smaller the difference between their
Table 4 | NPI licensing acceptance rate: fixed effects for two different
NPI licensors.
Licensor No Licensor Only
Pr(>|z|) Pr(>|z|)
Grammaticality 4.2e-11*** 6.9e-09***
Interference 1.6e-08*** 6.2 − 07***
CSscore 0.15 0.37
Gram:CSscore 0.32 0.27
Inter:CSscore 0.03* 0.07∧
model = lmer[acceptance ∼ gram * CSscore + inter * CSscore + (1 + gram +
inter|subj) + (1 + gram + inter + CSscore|item), data = dataframe, family =
“binomial”]. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001; ∧p < 0.1.
Table 5 | NPI licensing RTs: fixed effects from the maximal linear
mixed effects model on the critical word and the spill-over word.
CW CW+ 1
p-value p-value
Grammaticality <0.0001*** 0.03*
CSscore 0.76 0.36
Interference 0.02* 0.33
Licensor 0.68 0.006**
Gram:CSscore 0.88 0.28
Inter:CSscore 0.92 0.42
Licensor:CSscore 0.12 0.9
Inter:Licensor 0.22 0.33
CS:Inter:Licensor 0.4 0.53
model = lmer[logRT ∼ gram * CSscore + inter * CSscore + licensor * CSscore
+ licensor:inter + licensr:inter:CSscore + (1 + gram + licensor + inter |subj) +
(1 + gram + licensor + inter |item), data = dataframe]. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01;
***p < 0.001.
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interference condition and plain unlicensed condition. In other
words, participants with higher CS scores treated the interference
conditions like the plain unlicensed condition, and rejected them
both; on the other hand, participants with lower CS scores were
more likely to erroneously accept the interference conditions. We
plot the correlation results in Figures 2A, 3A.
Second, we carried out a split-group analysis.We separated our
participants into two groups along the median split of their CS
scores: participants in one group had CS scores above 3 (high CS
group, n = 36), and participants in the other group had scores
below 3 (low CS group, n = 43). Participants who had a CS of
exactly 3 were not included in either group. In Figures 2B, 3B, we
present the mean acceptance rate results for these two participant
groups, separated by licensor type.
We carried out mixed effects models for each CS group under
each licensor. Licensor no and only showed very similar patterns.
For licensor no (Figure 2B), both high and low-CS groups showed
the expected Grammaticality effect (ps < 0.0001); but only the
FIGURE 2 | The interaction between interference effect and CS scores
in acceptance rate, for the NPI licensor no. (A) Correlation between each
individual subject’s difference scores between their interference condition
and the plain unlicensed condition (Y -axis: acceptance rate of
Interference—acceptance rate of Unlicensed) and their CS scores (X -axis:
CS scores). (B) Acceptance rate for each condition plotted separately for
the high and low CS groups.
FIGURE 3 | The interaction between interference effect and CS scores
in acceptance rate, for the NPI licensor only. (A) Correlation between
each individual subject’s difference scores between their interference
condition and the plain unlicensed condition (Y -axis: acceptance rate of
Interference—acceptance rate of Unlicensed) and their CS scores (X -axis:
CS scores). (B) Acceptance rate for each condition plotted separately for
the high and low CS groups.
low CS group showed an Interference effect (high CS: p > 0.3;
low CS: p < 0.0001). For licensor only (Figure 3B), both high
and low CS groups showed a clear Grammaticality effect (ps <
0.0001). The low CS group also showed a strong Interference
effect (p < 0.0001), whereas this effect was much weaker for the
high CS group (p < 0.06).
To summarize the acceptance rating data on NPIs, the
group averaged data showed an interference effect, but this
effect is crucially modulated by individual subjects’ pragmatic-
communicative skills, across different licensors.
Self-paced reading time
In Figure 4, we plot the reading time from four words prior to the
NPI word ever and two words after it, with combined data from
licensor no and licensor only. As shown in the plot, combined
data from no and only showed differences among the licensed,
interference, and unlicensed conditions only immediately at the
critical NPI word (CW) ever. The grand average RTs on the CW
are shown in Table 2.
We carried out mixed effects linear regression modeling on the
RTs at the CW. The fixed and random effect structures are essen-
tially the same as in our mixed effects logistic models discussed
earlier. Prior to the analyses, we log-transformed all the RTs, and
centered the CS scores. We first did analyses on the entire data
set, and then did separate analyses for licensors no and only. The
model output from the entire data set on the CW is presented
below.
On the CW, the results revealed the expected effects for
Grammaticality and Interference, but in contrast to the accep-
tance rate results, there was no interaction between CS scores
and Interference. On the spill-over word CW + 1, there was a
Grammaticality effect, but no Interference. There was also an
unpredicted effect of Licensor. Further examination showed that
this effect appeared because the grammatical and interference
conditions under “only” were both read slower than the same two
conditions under “no.” Since this effect wasn’t predicted under
any of our hypotheses, we will not go into it further. We next
analyzed data for no and only separately.
Licensor no
On the word CW. The word-by-word RTs (4 words prior and 2
words after the CW) are plotted in Figure 5A. On the CW ever,
FIGURE 4 | Word-by-word reading times for the NPI stimuli set,
collapsing the licensors “no” and “only.”
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FIGURE 5 | Reading times when the NPI licensor was “no.” (A) Word-by-word reading time cross all subjects. (B) Word-by-word reading time for the high
CS group. (C) Word-by-word reading time for the low CS group.
Table 6 | NPI licensing RTs: fixed effects from the linear mixed effect
models, separated for two different licensors.
Word CW Word CW+1
Licensor Licensor Licensor Licensor
No Only No Only
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Grammaticality 0.0005*** <0.0001*** 0.01* 0.2
Interference 0.005** 0.15 0.5 0.1
CSscore 0.60 0.96 0.3 0.4
Gram:CSscore 0.35 0.53 0.4 0.1
Inter:CSscore 0.79 0.92 0.5 0.6
model = lmer(logRT ∼ gram * CSscore + inter * CSscore + (1+ gram +
inter|subj) + (1+ gram + inter + CSscore|item),data = dataframe). *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
the grammatical condition was read faster (421ms) than both the
plain unlicensed condition (473ms) and the interference condi-
tion (439ms); but, the interference condition was also faster than
the plain unlicensed condition, suggesting an interference effect.
The output of the mixed effects linear regression model for
reading times on the CW is presented in Table 6. The model out-
put shows a significant effect of Grammaticality and Interference,
suggesting that the grammatical condition is read significantly
faster than both ungrammatical conditions, while the interfer-
ence condition is read faster than the plain unlicensed condition.
But, the model did not show any effect of CS scores, nor any
interaction between CS scores and any other effects.
Although the interaction between CS scores and Interference
shown inTable 6 isn’t significant, to find out if there was any trend
of an effect from CS scores, we carried out an exploratory corre-
lation and split group analysis for the CW. The procedure was
the same as with the analyses of acceptance rate data presented
above. The first result is that there was no correlation between
CS scores and interference [Pearson’s r = −0.05, t(86) = −0.49,
p > 0.6]. For the split group analysis, we again separated par-
ticipants into a high-CS (n = 36) and a low-CS group (n = 43)
based on the median-split (CS = 3) of their CS scores. The mean
RT for each group is plotted in Figures 5B,C. For the high-CS
group, on the CW ever, neither the effect of Grammaticality nor
Interference was significant (ps > 0.2)—there was no difference
between any of the conditions (licensed, 433ms; interference,
438ms; unlicensed, 454ms). For the low-CS group, however, both
Grammaticality (p < 0.01) and Interference (p < 0.05) were sig-
nificant. The licensed NPI (417ms) was read faster than the
unlicensed (480ms) and the interference condition (433ms);
the interference condition was also faster than the unlicensed
condition.
To summarize, on the CW, the averaged data showed the
standard Grammaticality and Interference effect, but neither the
mixed effects model nor the correlation analyses suggested any
interaction between CS scores and the Interference effect. The
split group analysis showed a small trend of modulation by CS
scores: only the low-CS-scores group showed Interference, but it
is difficult to draw any conclusions from this result since the high-
CS-scores group did not show any difference between conditions,
let alone an interference effect.
On the word CW + 1. On the spillover word (Figure 5A), the
grand average over all the participants showed a faster reading
time on the licensed condition (407ms) than on the interfer-
ence and unlicensed conditions (both were 434ms). There is a
significant Grammaticality effect, but no effect of Interference,
CS scores, or any interactions (see Table 6). The exploratory
correlation analysis found no correlation between the size of
the interference effect and the CS scores [Pearson’s r = −0.07,
t(86) = −0.7, p > 0.4]. The exploratory split-group analysis in
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FIGURE 6 | Reading times when the NPI licensor was “only.” (A) Word-by-word reading time cross all subjects. (B) Word-by-word reading time for the high
CS group. (C) Word-by-word reading time for the low CS group.
which we separated the high-CS and low-CS groups of partici-
pants, however, revealed different trends for the two groups (see
Figures 5B,C). For the high-CS group, there was an effect of
Grammaticality (p < 0.01), but no Interference (p > 0.6). The
licensed condition (410ms) was read faster than both the inter-
ference (450ms) and the unlicensed conditions (446ms), and
there was no difference between the latter two. For the low-
CS group, there was no effect of Grammaticality or Interference
(Grammaticality, p > 0.2; Interference, p > 0.5; licensed, 402ms;
interference, 428ms; unlicensed, 413ms).
To summarize the results for the licensor no, grand aver-
age data showed a significant Grammaticality effect and an
Interference effect on the CW. For the spillover word, there was
only a Grammaticality effect. However, when we separated the
high-CS group from the low-CS group, there was a trend of an
effect of CS scores: for the high-CS group, there was no difference
at the CW, but there was a grammaticality effect at the spill-over
word, without an interference effect; for the low-CS group, there
was both a grammaticality and an interference effect on the CW,
yet no differences at the spill-over word. In other words, the low-
CS group showed immediate sensitivity to ungrammaticality at
the critical NPI word, but this sensitivity is also prone to an inter-
ference effect; the high-CS group, on the other hand, was slightly
delayed in showing sensitivity to ungrammaticality, but, at the
same time, was more resistant to the interference effect. Some
caution is warranted, however, in interpreting the results from the
split-group analysis, since based on the comprehensive model and
the exploratory correlation analysis, the interaction between CS
scores and Interference essentially presented a null result.
Licensor only
On the word CW. The grand average of the word-by-word RTs
are shown in Figure 6A. On the CW ever, the licensed condi-
tion (420ms) was read faster than the plain unlicensed condition
(473ms) and the interference condition (453ms). The model
Table 7 | Number-agreement acceptance rate: fixed effects from the
mixed effect logistic model.
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
Grammaticality 1.99 0.2 9.4 <2e-16***
Interference 0.82 0.15 5.59 2.3e-08***
CSscore 0.09 0.07 1.25 0.2
Gram:CSscore 0.04 0.06 0.68 0.5
Inter:CSscore −0.02 0.04 −0.61 0.5
model = lmer(acceptance ∼ gram * CSscore + inter * CSscore + (1+ gram
+ inter|subj) + (1+ gram + inter + CSscore|item),data = dataframe, family =
“binomial”). ***p < 0.001.
output in Table 6 shows only a significant Grammaticality effect,
but no Interference effect. This is significantly different from
licensor no, and we will discuss it further in the general discussion.
The results from the exploratory correlation analysis found no
correlation [Pearson’s r = 0.03, t(86) = 0.3, p> 0.7]. Results from
the split group analysis are shown in Figures 6B,C. For the high-
CS group, there was an effect Grammaticality (p < 0.001), but no
effect of Interference (p > 0.4): the licensed condition (401ms)
was read significantly faster than both the interference condition
(446ms) and the unlicensed condition (454ms), and there was
no difference between the latter two. For the low-CS group, there
was also an effect of Grammaticality (p < 0.01). There seems to
be a numerical trend of interference, but the effect of Interference
wasn’t significant (p > 0.2) (licensed 434ms; unlicensed 480ms;
interference 458ms).
On the word CW + 1. On the spillover word, the grand
means (Figure 6) of the three conditions are: licensed 428ms,
interference 454ms, and unlicensed 434ms. The comprehen-
sive mixed-effect model did not reveal any significant effects of
Grammaticality or Interference (Table 6), and this was confirmed
by the mixed effect models within each CS group (all ps> 0.1).
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FIGURE 7 | The interaction between interference effect and CS scores
in acceptance rate, for subject-verb agreement errors. (A) Correlation
between each individual subject’s difference scores between their
interference condition and the plain unlicensed condition (Y -axis:
acceptance rate of Interference—acceptance rate of Ungrammatical) and
their CS scores (X -axis: CS scores). (B) Acceptance rate for each condition
plotted separately for the high and low CS groups.
Table 8 | Number agreement RTs: fixed effects from the linear mixed
effect model.
Word CW Word CW + 1
p-value p-value
Grammaticality <0.0001*** <0.0001***
Interference 0.01* 0.5
CSscore 0.5 0.6
Gram:CSscore 0.6 0.5
Inter:CSscore 0.6 0.6
model = lmer(logRT ∼ gram * CSscore + inter * CSscore + (1+ gram +
inter|subj) + (1+ gram + inter + CSscore|item), data = dataframe). *p < 0.05;
***p < 0.001.
To summarize the self-paced reading time data from the
licensor only, the grand average data showed a grammaticality
effect without an interference effect. The same pattern largely
holds for both high and low-CS groups, but the low-CS group
showed a small trend of interference, as well.
Subject-verb number agreement
Within the subject-verb number agreement materials, two
Helmert contrasts were defined in order to examine both the
grammaticality effect: Grammaticality (10a vs. 10b and 10c in
Table 1), and the interference effect: Interference (10b vs. 10c).
Everything else about the mixed effects model structures was set
up in the same way as for the analyses of NPI licensing.
Acceptability rating
The average acceptability rating (see Table 2) was 0.92 for the
grammatical condition (10a), 0.12 on the plain ungrammati-
cal condition (10c), and 0.28 on the interference ungrammatical
condition (10b). Themixed effects logistic model showed a signif-
icant Grammaticality effect and a significant Interference effect.
No other effects were significant. Crucially different from the NPI
results (see Tables 3, 4), CS scores did not affect participants’
judgment of subject-verb agreement errors. Themodel output for
the fixed effects is shown below in Table 7.
Tomake a parallel comparison with the NPI stimuli, Figure 7A
presents the correlation between the interference effect and CS
scores, and Figure 7B presents the median-split analysis. The lack
of correlation in Figure 7A (Pearson’s r = 0.05, p > 0.6) confirms
that CS scores did not affect the interference effect in the agree-
ment items. And the mixed effect models within each group also
found the same Grammaticality and Interference effects for both
high and low-CS groups (all ps< 0.0001).
Self-paced reading time
On the word CW. Word-by-word reading times are plotted in
Figure 8A. The average RTs on the critical verb (e.g., fail in exam-
ple 10b) are 463ms for the grammatical condition (10a), 547ms
for the plain ungrammatical condition (10c), and 509ms for the
interference condition (10b). The mixed effects model showed a
significant effect of Grammaticality and Interference (see Table 8)
on the CW, such that the grammatical condition was read faster
than the other two conditions (a vs. b, c, p < 0.001), and the inter-
ference condition was read faster than the plain ungrammatical
condition (b vs. c, p < 0.01). There were no interactions between
Interference and CS scores.
The split-group analysis, as shown in Figures 8B,C, revealed
qualitatively similar patterns for high-CS and low-CS groups. For
the high-CS group, there was an effect of Grammaticality (p <
0.001): the grammatical condition (439ms) was read significantly
faster than both the ungrammatical condition (511ms) and the
interference condition (481ms); and an effect of Interference as
well (although slightly weaker, p < 0.07). For the low CS group,
the grammatical condition (480ms) was read significantly faster
than both the ungrammatical condition (576ms) and the inter-
ference condition (521ms); and the difference between the latter
two was also significant (Grammaticality, p < 0.01; Interference,
p < 0.01).
On the word CW+ 1
At the spillover word, grand averages of the three conditions
were: grammatical 428ms, interference 480ms, and ungrammat-
ical 493ms. The mixed effects model showed a significant effect
of Grammaticality, but no effect of Interference (see Table 8). The
split-group analysis (see Figure 8) revealed very similar results for
both participant groups. For the high-CS group, the grammat-
ical condition (429ms) was read faster than the ungrammatical
condition (502ms) and the interference condition (500ms), and
there was no difference between the latter two (Grammaticality,
p < 0.0001; Interference, p > 0.8). The low-CS group showed
the same pattern: the grammatical condition (420ms) was read
faster than the ungrammatical (485ms) and interference (477ms)
conditions (effect of Grammaticality, p < 0.001), with no sig-
nificant difference between the latter two (effect of Interference,
p > 0.8).
To summarize, for the agreement stimuli, we observed the
grammaticality effect and the interference effect in both accept-
ability ratings and the self-paced reading time on the critical
word. On the spillover word, self-paced RTs only showed a gram-
maticality effect, but no interference. In all these measures, the
high and low-CS participants performed in very similar ways.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study revealed three main findings. First, only
NPI interference, but not agreement interference, is affected by
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FIGURE 8 | Reading times for the agreement set of the stimuli. (A) Word-by-word reading times across all subjects. (B) Word-by-word reading times for the
high CS group. (C) Word-by-word reading times for the low CS group.
individual subject’s pragmatic-communicative skills. Second, the
modulation of pragmatic-communicative skills mostly has its
effect on offline acceptability rating, but not online reading time,
although there seems to be a trend of effect in online RTs as
well. And third, different NPI licensors, in particular, no and
only, presented distinct interference profiles: while both showed
offline interference in acceptability, NPIs under only did not show
online interference. We turn below to the discussion of these
observations.
INTERFERENCE IN ACCEPTANCE RATE AND THE EFFECT OF
AUTISTIC TRAITS
A critical finding of the current study is that for the NPI materi-
als, but not for the agreement interference stimuli, participants’
acceptance rate was affected by their autistic-associated traits; in
particular, their communication skills, as measured by the CS of
the AQ questionnaire. Participants with higher CS scores, i.e.,
those that are relatively worse in their general pragmatic com-
municative skills, were less prone to NPI interference, as demon-
strated by their more accurate acceptability judgments. On the
other hand, participants with better communicative skills (lower
CS scores) more often accepted the interference conditions. In
contrast to the case with NPI licensing, participants’ autistic traits
did not seem to affect their acceptance of subject-verb agree-
ment sentences, suggesting that subject-verb interference andNPI
interference, although on the surface they look very similar, may
arise from different sources.
We argue that the different interference profiles stem from the
fact that NPI licensing and subject-verb agreement are different
types of linguistic dependencies. It is uncontroversial that subject-
verb number agreement involves a syntactic matching process
that checks the number features on the subject and its corre-
sponding verb. In incremental parsing, the subject of a sentence
is likely to have been removed from focal attention when the
verb is encountered (McElree, 2001); therefore, the real-time con-
struction of a subject-verb agreement relationship depends on the
successful retrieval of the subject’s features. Memory-retrieval-
based interference arises when the target of retrieval shares certain
features with other items that have recently been processed (Lewis
and Vasishth, 2005; Lewis et al., 2006). Under this account of
subject-verb agreement and the corresponding interference effect,
interference errors stem from misapplication of the mechanism
by which number agreement is computed.
We likewise argue that NPI interference is closely tied to one
of the mechanisms by which NPIs are regularly licensed. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, in addition to a logical-semantic
mechanism, there is also a pragmatic component to NPI licens-
ing in English. Particularly relevant to our purposes here, negative
inferences are employed regularly as part of a pragmatic licens-
ing mechanism for NPIs. During the comprehension process, the
parser may over-apply the pragmatic licensing strategy, and use
even unwarranted negative inferences to license NPIs, resulting in
interference.
Under this account, interference in syntactic agreement and
interference in NPI licensing are driven, at least partially, by dif-
ferent underlying sources. This shouldn’t be totally unexpected,
since these two linguistic phenomena involve different represen-
tations and computations in the first place: the agreement process
is purely syntactic, whereas NPI licensing is at the interface of dif-
ferent systems, including syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. It is
not surprising that the specific linguistic properties of each con-
struction lead to substantial differences in how they are processed
in comprehension.
The current results also add to the growing literature that
autistic traits are present among the neurotypical population and
they affect language processing in non-trivial ways. Our results, in
line with previous findings, suggest that the two sub-scales from
the AQ—Social Skill and Communication—may have particular
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influence on pragmatic language processing. Since case studies
in this regard are still relatively sparse, more future research is
needed to further establish this association. There are many dif-
ferent kinds of pragmatic phenomena in language processing, and
it is an open question whether they are in general affected by indi-
vidual differences along the dimension of autistic traits. If it turns
out that autistic traits only selectively target a subset of these phe-
nomena, it would be very informative for the construction of a
constrained pragmatic theory of language processing.
ONLINE INTERFERENCE AND THE (LACK OF) EFFECT OF
AUTISTIC TRAITS
Although there is a strong effect of autistic traits on the offline
acceptability rating, their effect on online reading time is much
weaker. The split group analysis seems to show a trend where
there is more interference for the low-CS group than the high-
CS group, but the mixed effects models revealed no interaction
between CS scores and interference effect. The lack of an inter-
action in the comprehensive model could be due to insufficient
power in the data, in which case we may still consider the online
interference effect as being qualitatively similar to the offline
effect. This is a potential explanation, but also one that is difficult
to validate given the null result. While keeping this possibility in
mind, we will entertain the alternative possibility that there is gen-
uinely no effect of CS scores on online interference and discuss the
implications of that possibility. Another interesting observation
about the online interference effect is that, for NPI licensing, we
only observed interference for the licensor no, but not the licen-
sor only. The difference between these two licensors is important
for our explanation of the online interference effect, but we will
focus only on no for the moment, and come back to only in the
next section.
The lack of modulation by participants’ communicative-
pragmatic skills on the online interference effect suggests that
NPI licensing may actually involve a syntactic matching pro-
cess, like subject-verb agreement. This was the original hypothesis
in Vasishth et al. (2008), which postulated a search process for
a syntactic [+Neg] feature when an NPI word such as ever is
encountered. We questioned this hypothesis earlier because it
does not fully represent how NPIs are licensed—it overlooks the
fact that NPI licensing is not just a syntactic process, but involves
semantic and pragmatic mechanisms. However, the fact that NPI
licensing is an interface phenomenon that involves multiple levels
of representations and processes does not exclude the possibil-
ity that syntactic matching exists within one sub-component of
the licensing process. The syntactic [+Neg] feature is a particu-
larly suitable candidate to serve as the relevant matching feature,
since, cross-linguistically, negation is the most robust NPI licen-
sor. This line of reasoning would make NPI licensing similar to
subject-verb agreement in some respects. If the regular memory
retrieval mechanisms apply in both cases, one would expect
similar online interference with no modulation from individual
pragmatic skills.
We also want to point out that, by recognizing such a syn-
tactic licensing process, at least for licensors such as no (see the
contrast with only below), we acknowledge a syntactic process for
NPI licensing that has not been fully recognized or emphasized in
previous research for weak NPIs like ever, which can be licensed
under a broad range of licensors. Polarity items that are only
licensed by negation—called “strict” NPIs (Giannakidou, 1998,
2011; Zwarts, 1998)—are cross-linguistically common, for exam-
ple, so-called “n-words” in Romance languages. Purely syntactic
mechanisms like agreement have been proposed to account for
the distribution of n-words (Haegeman and Zanuttini, 1991;
Zanuttini, 1991; Zeijlstra, 2004, inter alia). But, traditionally, the
general account of NPI licensing, especially for weak NPIs like
ever, has been deliberately divorced from an agreement-based
explanation. We agree with the traditional wisdom, but based on
the current data, we also suggest that a syntactic feature match-
ing process may exist in parallel with other licensing mechanisms,
even for weak NPIs, at least for a subset of licensors—those that
contain a syntactic [+Neg] feature.
Licensing as an integrated syntax-semantics process is to be
expected if (a) we take seriously the idea that NPI licensing is a
grammatical phenomenon driven by the logical properties of lex-
ical expressions, and (b) there is a strict isomorphism between
the syntax and the semantics. Under these two theses, the logical
property of negation is mapped onto a morphosyntactic fea-
ture [+negative] (for an early discussion of such a model see
Giannakidou, 1998). NPI licensing will then always involve at
least this component of integrated syntax-semantics matching,
and online processes access that. But importantly, even if we rec-
ognize a syntactic feature-matching component in NPI licensing,
the overall process is still crucially different from subject-verb
agreement in many ways. In particular, NPI licensing involves
semantic and syntactic, as well as pragmatic mechanisms, as we
discussed earlier. But for the agreement sentences, whether they
are acceptable or not is determined only by whether or not
the syntactic matching process on the relevant number feature
is successful—there is no obvious connection between the pro-
cessing of syntactic agreement and the final interpretation of a
sentence. For instance, Lau et al. (2008) showed that when people
were lured by interfering agreement number features, as in “The
phone by the toilets were . . . ,” they nevertheless did not make mis-
takes in assigning the correct thematic role to the subject. NPI
licensing, on the other hand, is a very different phenomenon. The
presence of an NPI makes important contributions to the final
propositional content. The acceptability of an NPI is not deter-
mined by the syntactic matching process alone, but is instead
crucially regulated by semantic and pragmatic integration con-
ditions. The effect of pragmatic inferences could be particularly
strong in offline tasks, since participants are given enough time to
reflect on what the target stimulus actually means, or could have
meant.
The strong offline effect of individual subject’s pragmatic skills
leads to the question why such effects did not surface in online
interference. One possibility is that the influence of pragmatic fac-
tors in online measures could have been masked by the strong
presence of the memory-retrieval based effect, and hence was
undetectable. This is not the most likely hypothesis, since for the
licensor only, which we argue did not participate in a memory-
retrieval based interference effect, we still did not observe a
pragmatically driven interference in online measures. The other
possibility is that since these interference sentences are ultimately
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ungrammatical, the pragmatic inference may be a “last resort”
strategy” in these situations, and hence have a delayed effect. We
discuss these issues in more details in the next section, together
with data from the licensor only.
Our current discussion about the source of online interference
for no departs somewhat from our earlier work in Xiang et al.
(2009), in which we conjectured that even the online interfer-
ence effect for no (and few) was driven by pragmatic processes.
In the current discussion we draw a distinction between online
and offline interference effects, and argue that since a syntac-
tic matching process is possible between no and an NPI, (some)
online interference may thereby arise through a memory retrieval
process, as argued in Vasishth et al. (2008) (modulo the possible
additional contribution of a pragmatic process, as shown by the
trend in the split group analysis). However, one important feature
of the original analysis in Vasishth et al. (2008) is that memory
search targets positions that are ruled out on syntactic grounds,
and that NPI interference under no is a demonstration of syntactic
interference, as accessing a licensor in a non-commanding posi-
tion purportedly violates syntactic constraints. We do not think
that the current results necessarily commit us to this position. We
contend that questions about the search mechanism (i.e., whether
or not the search process is blind/insensitive to syntactic con-
straints) and whether or not NPI licensing shows similarity-based
feature interference may be two orthogonal issues. Although NPIs
are generally c-commanded by their licensors, it is not obvious
that a c-command requirement should be stated explicitly as part
of the syntactic requirements on NPI licensing. It could simply
be an epiphenomenon, within an isomorphic syntax-semantics
level, of the semantic requirement that an NPI needs to stay in
the semantic scope of its licensor. The computation of the seman-
tic scope may track configurational relations like c-command, but
this does not necessarily mean that the parser actually makes ref-
erence to the c-command condition in online processing. In other
words, the memory retrieval process may target a [+negative]
element, instead of a [+negative, +c-command] element, while
there is simultaneously a semantic condition that checks whether
or not the NPI falls within the semantic scope of the retrieved
target. Of course this leaves open a number of non-trivial ques-
tions as to how semantic scope is tracked in online processing.
One possibility is that we encode [+scope] in some way as a lex-
ical feature on the retrieval target, and interference would arise
largely in the same fashion as the proposal in Vasishth et al.
(2008), but with the syntactic feature [+c-command] replaced by
the semantic feature [+scope]. This approach calls for a detailed
implementation as to how scope relations could be encoded as
lexical features, when they obviously are not features stored in the
lexicon. The other possibility is that scope relation can only fall
out while propositional content is being incrementally composed,
rather than being encoded on lexical items. If this is true, we need
an explicit algorithm that can both derive correct scope relations
at the proposition level, and also allow incorrect scope relations
to be derived, in order to account for the interference effect. We
do not have answers to these questions. But we think it would
be too hasty to reach a conclusion about the exact search mech-
anism involved in NPI interference without fully exploring all of
these logical possibilities.
DIFFERENT TYPES OF NPI LICENSORS
The perspective that multiple mechanisms are acting in parallel
to license NPIs also helps explain the difference observed between
the licensors no and only.
As discussed above, there is consensus that only does not
license NPIs through a lexically encoded (syntactic) [+negative]
feature, though the exact licensing mechanism for only as an NPI
licensor is still under debate. The difference between only and
other negative licensors such as no (or few) can be demonstrated
by the syntactic diagnostics provided in Klima (1964), as was
illustrated earlier.
In the current results, we saw that on grammatical condi-
tions, NPIs licensed under only were accepted less often than
those licensed under no (Figure 1). This could be due to a num-
ber of factors. For instance, no is a more frequent licensor than
only in naturally occurring utterances (Xiang et al., 2009). This
may have influenced the acceptability ratings of the two licensors.
Alternatively, under the licensor no, an NPI can be licensed both
syntactically and semantically. Syntactically, a feature-matching
process may search and identify a target with a [+Neg] feature;
semantically, a negative meaning may also be calculated. Syntactic
and semantic processes converge on the final representation in
which an NPI is licensed.With the licensor only, however, the syn-
tactic feature-matching process fails, since only does not contain a
morphosyntactic feature [+Neg]. Then, only the semantic route
(via the exceptive entailment “nobody other than”) would be
available. The failure of isomorphism between syntax and seman-
tics, in contrast with no, may have reduced the acceptability of
NPIs under only. In a recent study (Xiang et al., 2013), acceptabil-
ity ratings were collected for a larger set of licensors, including no,
few, only, and emotive factives such as amazed, surprised, etc. It
was found that the two syntactically negative licensors no and few
are judged more acceptable than only and emotive factives, which
are both non-negative. This is completely in line with the results
reported here. Furthermore, since few is also much less frequent
than no as an NPI licensor (Xiang et al., 2009), this result also sug-
gests that lexical frequency per se does not completely determine
the degree to which a licensor is accepted.
It is worth noting that the current study also revealed some
difference between no and only: there was no obvious online inter-
ference effect for only (modulo the possibility that the low-CS
group may have shown a trend of online interference). In a pre-
vious self-paced reading study, Xiang et al. (2006) also showed a
lack of interference effect in online RTs for only. As mentioned
earlier, the interference effect of only, or the lack of one, has
not been widely tested. Although the current results showed a
difference between no and only when we analyzed these two licen-
sors separately (Table 6), there wasn’t a Licensor by Interference
interaction in the overall model in Table 5. This could be due
to insufficient power in the data. We are fully aware that the
lack of an interaction may undermine our proposed account
of only here. More studies are needed to verify whether or not
only is indeed resistant to online interference. But if it is, such
a result is completely in line with the distinction we draw here
between no and only: the former, but not the latter, is targeted by
a syntactic feature-matching process. Therefore, similarity-based
interference, which crucially relies on specific lexical features, will
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not arise for only online. The immediate question for this expla-
nation is why pragmatically-driven interference does not appear
online.
One possibility is that the pragmatic inferences that drive the
interference effect cannot be generated in time to trigger online
interference. Instead, they are delayed until a later stage, and
therefore only offline tasks can detect them. This is not the most
likely hypothesis, however, given the large literature that has sug-
gested that pragmatic inferences can be incrementally generated
online (Altmann and Steedman, 1988; Sedivy et al., 1999; van
Berkum, 2009; Nieuwland and Kuperberg, 2008). We propose
that the reason pragmatically-driven interferences were predom-
inately observed offline in the present study is not that such
inferences failed to become available in time, but rather that
the available inferences were not immediately adopted by the
comprehension system to license NPIs.
First of all, the pragmatic licensing mechanism could in gen-
eral be a more costly strategy than regular syntactic and semantic
mechanisms. In a recent ERP study, Xiang et al. (2012, 2013)
showed that, even for grammatically acceptable sentences, there
is difference between NPIs that are licensed under pragmatically-
derived negation (e.g., the negative implicature from emotive fac-
tive predicates) and those that are licensed under regular semantic
negation (such as no)—only the semantic negation, but not the
pragmatic negation, had a small P600 compared to the ungram-
matical control condition. Second, as we mentioned above, while
we recognize that pragmatically-derived negative implicatures
can license NPIs, we also recognize that not all implicatures can
do so. The specific conditions characterizing the “usable” impli-
catures are yet to be isolated, but we have conjectured that the
kind of pragmatic implicatures that trigger interference effects are
normally insufficient to actually license NPIs. It is likely that the
comprehension system does not resort to such implicatures unless
it is pushed into a corner, as in the presence of an ungrammati-
cal sentence. If pragmatically-driven interference were the result
of a last-resort strategy, it wouldn’t necessarily surface in online
processing.
A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SYSTEM OF NPI LICENSING
NPI licensing reveals a case in which syntactic, semantic, and
pragmatic processes act in parallel during parsing, which makes
NPI licensing qualitatively different from purely syntactic depen-
dencies, such as subject-verb agreement. The processing profile of
NPI licensing is therefore much more complicated. Some licen-
sors, such as no, which can participate in a syntactic licensing
relation with an NPI, may be targeted by the same memory
retrieval mechanisms that target other syntactic dependencies;
but, for other licensors that do not bear the relevant syntactic
features, memory retrieval of a lexical feature does not apply. In
addition, since pragmatic licensing is a regular mechanism for
NPI licensing, at least for English weak NPIs, the comprehen-
sion system may stretch it to cases in which pragmatic licens-
ing normally does not apply, leading to pragmatically-driven
interference.
To account for the full complexity of NPI licensing and the
interference effect associated with it, a number of open issues
need to be addressed in future work. First of all, if, as we argued
above, interference associated with feature similarity only arises
for licensors that contain a lexical [+negative] feature, we pre-
dict that online interference should be observed for some NPI
licensors, but not others. Expressions that can license NPIs and,
at the same time, are categorized as real negative expressions
(i.e., under Klima, 1964) include no, none, not, never, few, hardly,
scarcely, seldom, etc.; on the other hand, licensors that are not
negative in the regular sense include the examples we mentioned
earlier, such as only, every, comparatives, conditionals, emotive
factives, questions, etc. Neither of these two groups has been
tested exhaustively.
Second, we have argued that NPI interference is partially
driven by pragmatic inferences, especially in the case of offline
interference. We have made suggestions both about how such
inferences arise and why they seem to be more prominent
in offline measures. Our account of pragmatic interferences is
closely associated with a particular construction that has been
heavily tested by other researchers, as well as in our current
work—that is, relative clauses. We made use of the well-known
fact that modifiers, with relative clauses as a prime example, invite
contrastive inferences. This gives rise to the following prediction:
complement clauses (such as “The fact that no student passed the
exam . . . ”), which are minimally different from relative clauses
but do not serve a modifier function, should not show inter-
ference effects, or at least not the kind of interference effect we
have shown that can be modulated by individual subjects’ prag-
matic skills. Some results from Parker and Phillips (2011) provide
preliminary support for this prediction. These authors showed
a reduced interference effect for complement clauses, compared
to relative clause structures, under the licensor no. Furthermore,
with a licensor like only (as in “The fact the only the best students
passed the exam . . . ”), we predict that the interference effect on
such clauses should be reduced to minimum, since the pragmatic
source of interference has been entirely eliminated by the com-
plement clause, and, in the meantime, “only” does not trigger
syntactically associated interference either.
Finally, most of the current work on NPI interference has
focused on languages that allow weak NPIs. These have a broad
distribution and can be licensed under a variety of licensors.
We conjectured that, for such NPIs, an independently available
pragmatic licensing mechanism is over-applied in some situ-
ations, resulting in interference. Cross-linguistically, however,
many languages have NPIs that are much more restricted in their
distribution. It is possible that for some of these stricter NPIs,
pragmatic-licensing mechanisms are never available in the gram-
mar. This territory—interference with such NPIs—is still largely
uncharted (for a recent examination of this sort, see Yanilmaz
and Drury, 2013) ; and if they do show interference, we predict
9The recent ERP findings in Yanilmaz and Drury (2013) tested Turkish NPIs
that have a very limited distribution. Interference was found on these NPIs.
Since the constructions tested there were very different from the ones tested
here (sentential complement of a matrix verb was tested), we won’t go into
further details. But the additional novel factor in Yanilmaz and Drury (2013)
is that NPIs in Turkish come before their licensors in linear order, which may
result in a forward expectation of a licensor (e.g., similar to a regular filler-gap
dependency), rather than just backward search, as in the case of English NPIs.
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it to be syntactically-driven interference, and not to be subject to
individual differences in pragmatic skills.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we compared the interference effects in syntac-
tic agreement and NPI licensing, especially with respect to their
modulation by individual subjects’ pragmatic skills. We showed
that the interference profile for NPI licensing is more complicated
than that for syntactic agreement, due to their representational
differences. In particular, NPI interference is affected by (a) the
type of NPI licensors involved, (b) the particular experimental
tasks, and (c) individual subjects’ pragmatic-communicative
skills. All together, our results show that NPI licensing, different
from the pure syntactic processes involved in agreement, evokes
multiple different processes corresponding to different levels, or
dimensions, of linguistic representations.
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APPENDIX
The interactions between the other four sub-scales from AQ
and each of the fixed effect predictors, for NPI licensing and
number agreement separately. The mixed effect models are con-
structed in similar ways as the models in Tables 3, 5, 7, 8. As
shown below, the only significant effect observed is the inter-
action between the Social Skill sub-scale and the offline NPI
interference effect (i.e., acceptance rate). This is similar to the
effect of the Communication sub-scale. No other interaction was
observed.
Table 9 |
NPI licensing Number agreement
Acceptance rate Interaction with Interaction with Interaction with Interaction with Interaction with
(p-value) Interference Licensor Grammaticality Interference Grammaticality
Social skill 0.006** 0.14 0.89 0.16 0.96
Attention to details 0.44 0.17 0.92 0.16 0.73
Attention switching 0.98 0.9 0.63 0.13 0.56
Imagination 0.15 0.44 0.94 0.61 0.096
RT at the critical word Interaction with Interaction with Interaction with Interaction with Interaction with
(t-value) Intrusion Licensor Grammaticality Intrusion Grammaticality
Social skill −1.28 0.65 0.97 0.43 0.56
Attention to details 0.58 0.89 −0.74 0.65 −1.02
Attention switching −1.46 0.98 0.54 0.86 0.54
Imagination 0.13 0.57 0.07 0.54 0.17
**p < 0.01.
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